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ABSTRACT This paper focuses on several theoretical issues and principles in steganography security, and 
defines four security levels by analyzing the corresponding algorithm instances. In the theoretical analysis, 
we discuss the differences between steganography security and watermarking security. The two necessary 
conditions for the steganography security are obtained. Under the current technology situation, we then 
analyze the indistinguishability of the cover and stego-cover, and consider that the steganography security 
should rely on the key secrecy with algorithms open. By specifying the role of key in steganography, the 
necessary conditions for a secure steganography algorithm in theory are formally presented. When 
analyzing the security instances, we have classified the steganalysis attacks according to their variable 
access to the steganography system, and then defined the four security levels. The higher level security one 
has, the higher level attacks one can resist. We have also presented algorithm instances based on current 
technical conditions, and analyzed their data hiding process, security level, and practice requirements. 
INDEX TERMS Steganography security, Kerckhoofs’ principle, steganalysis attacks, generative 
adversarial networks, reversible data hiding in encrypted domain.
I. INTRODUCTION 
The modern secret communication technology originated 
from the military demands of the secret communication 
during World War II, and the realization of secret 
communication mainly consists of two major technologies: 
cryptography and steganography. From the viewpoint of 
security requirements, the significance of cryptography is to 
maintain the secrecy of the communication contents while 
that of steganography lies in the undetectability of the 
existence of the secret communication. From the viewpoint 
of the attacker or the analyzer, the purpose of the 
cryptanalysis is to finally obtain the decryption key or 
plaintext sequences while steganalysis is to detect the 
presence of the communication which does not require any 
communication content. Therefore, for the two security 
systems, security in steganography is more fragile than 
cryptography, i.e., once the existence of the communication 
is exposed or detected, security could be compromised. In 
this paper, steganography security is our main attention. 
The security levels of steganography are classified by 
introducing different models of attacks. And practical 
instances at different levels are present theoretically and 
practically based on existing data hiding technologies.  
Data hiding technology has evolved into two branches, 
watermarking and steganography. Their prototypes were 
first defined with modern terminology in Simmons’ 
founding work on subliminal channels and the prisoners’ 
problems [1]. We next analyze the differences existing in 
their security requirements, so as to accurately present the 
requirements of steganography security. 
In prisoner's problems [1], Alice and Bob are in jail and 
they want to devise an escape plan by exchanging hidden 
messages in innocent-looking covers (e.g., natural images). 
These covers are conveyed to one another by a common 
warden, Eve, who can eavesdrops all covers and can choose 
to interrupt the communication if they appear to be a stego-
cover. In this model, the secret communication consists of 
three basic elements: 1 secret message, 2 cover, and 3 open 
channel. The open channel has been assumed to be the 
worst case for steganography security, since the existence 
of the channel is implemented by Eve. Eve has access to all 
the contents that Alice and Bob have exchanged, and she 
can also interrupt the channel if she finds the exchange 
content is not normal. Then the steganography security can 
be considered as breach. However, the exposure of the 
secret communication is not a sufficient condition to breach 
the watermarking security, since watermarking is mainly 
used for the authentication and anti-counterfeit of the 
copyrights of the covers in practical applications. The 
presence of the watermark is directly exposed in the visible 
watermarking, or some copyright owners choose to disclose 
the watermark labels previously for future extraction and 
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certification.  
Under the watermarking mode, Eve's task is not only to 
detect the presence of the secret communication, but also to 
realize the destruction, tampering, and forging on the 
watermark. She needs to complete the goal of an active 
attacker, which is consistent with the definition by Kalker 
[2]: “Watermark security refers to the inability by 
unauthorised users to have access to the raw watermarking 
channel.” Under the steganography mode, Eve only needs 
to complete the goal of a passive attacker while the actual 
attack could be active behaviors. It means that Eve can 
perform active accumulation from the system aiming to 
detect the presence of the secret communication. Therefore, 
the steganography system gives Eve more active privileges 
to complete a passive attacking goal. From the perspective 
of the data hider (Alice or Bob), it calls for some higher 
security requirements to resist Eve in the steganography 
system. 
In conclusion, we can give the definition of the 
steganography security (stego-security for short):  
Definition 1, it can be considered as stego-security if it 
could ensure (passive or active) Eve cannot complete the 
following two attack goals:  
1. To detect that the stego-cover is unnatural; 
2. To extract the contents of the hidden message. 
The above two attacks can be interpreted that the 
existence of the secret communication is exposed from the 
perspective of the cover or the secret message, respectively. 
The occurrence of each exposure means the security breach. 
In Section V, we will continue to discuss them.  
It should be mentioned that J. Fridrich classified Eve’s 
behaviors into passive behavior, active behavior and 
malicious behavior [3]. The malicious behavior refers to an 
attack that Eve might destroy or tamper with the channel 
even when she is not aware of the existence of the secret 
communication. The main thing to consider then is 
robustness, not security, since such attack is not a threat to 
the security, even though the current channel is being 
vandalized. In the reality of multimedia and the network 
environment, the data hider can reselect another open 
channel, and it doesn’t consider the situation of no available 
channel. And also, the robustness is not the focus of this 
paper.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The 
following section discusses two stego-security principles of 
current technology. Section III introduces the security 
requirments of key in steganography. Section IV reviews 
the different theoretical models of data hiding, and then 
Section V describes the four levels of steganalysis attacks. 
In Section VI, the stego-security instances are discussed 
theoretically. Finally, Section VII summarizes the paper 
and discusses future investigations. 
II. SECURITY PRINCIPLES OF STEGANOGRAPHY 
The steganography cover is mainly digital images. 
Therefore, we analyze the following two security principles 
mainly based on image steganography in this section. 
A.  NOTATION 
In this paper, Cover, denoted as C, is used to carry secret 
messages and conceal the existence of the secret 
communication, such as images, videos, texts, etc. 
Stego-cover, denoted as C', is the cover that has been 
embedded with the secret message. 
Secret message, denoted as m, is the message to be 
embedded into the cover for communication. 
B.  INDISTINGUISHABILITY 
The indistinguishability of cover and stego-cover is an 
important guarantee of stego-security. For the attackers, it 
is a variety of covers that they can directly obtain in the 
open channels. Current steganography methods also focus 
on the indistinguishability. Due to the complexity of data 
hiding process and the texture of the cover image, it is 
unlikely that the message will be directly extracted by the 
attacker. Therefore, without considering the extraction of 
the secret message, the indistinguishability can be directly 
equivalent to the stego-security [4]-[7]. To discuss this 
issue, we give an explanation of the indistinguishability of 
cover and stego-cover.  
Firstly, the concept of an abstract distance D (D  0) in 
this paper is given, which quantifies the differentiability 
between different samples.  
D(P(C), P(C'))=0 indicates that the covers C is 
indistinguishable from the stego-covers C', which means 
not only the imperceptibility in the human visual system, 
but also the undetectability in the sense of statistical 
analysis. 
Definition 2, C and C' are indistinguishable iff (if and 
only if) 
 D(P(C), P(C'))=0                                (1) 
Definition 3, C and C' are distinguishable iff  
 D(P(C), P(C'))>0                                (2) 
In our analysis of the security, the standard of 
indistinguishability is D=0 theoretically, but in practical 
applications, it is usually not directly evaluated by D=0. 
Here, (t, ɛ)-distinguishable is defined: 
Definition 4, C and C' are (t, ɛ)-distinguishable iff 
 D(P(C), P(C'))>ɛ                             (3) 
in running time t, in which ɛ is an arbitrary small value. 
There are many specific mathematical tools to indicate the 
distance D. For the human visual system, there are mature 
measures used in the audiovisual quality of individual 
experience. ITU-T has defined several ways of subjective 
evaluation criteria, such as ITU-T Rec. P.910, this 
recommendation is intended to define non-interactive 
subjective assessment methods for evaluating the quality of 
digital images. Mean Opinion Score (MOS) is the most 
representative subjective evaluation method for image 
quality, which can judge the image quality by normalizing 
the evaluations of the observers [8]. For the statistical 
analysis, Cachin used kullback-leibler divergence distance 
(KL divergence distance, DKL) [4] to describe the 
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distribution deviation. The formalized expression of DKL in 
steganography system was given by using the information 
entropy theory [3], [5]. In [6], F. Cayre first reviewed 
several forms of watermark attacks, and then introduced 
conditional probability to analyze the watermarking 
security level in watermarked only attack (WOA), and gave 
a formalized expression of the highest watermarking 
security which was referred to as stego-security: 
P(C'/K)) = P(C)                                  (4) 
where P(C'/K) denotes the model of C' by data hiding key 
K. Then it is derived that Eq. (4) is equivalent to Eq. (1) by 
KL divergence distance. In [7], some security concepts 
were inspired by a cryptographic approach. It assumed that 
there was an attack to distinguish the different distribution 
models in polynomial time, the distinguishing probability 
of the attack was used to quantify the deviation of 
distributions. In the field of generative adversarial networks 
(GANs), the discriminator for measuring deviations 
between samples includes: Jensen-Shannon distance (JS 
distance, DJS) and Wessertein distance (W distance, Dw). W 
distance has advantage over the JS distance in optimizing 
the distribution of the output from the generators [9]. Since 
the imperceptibility in the human visual system mainly 
depends on the subjective evaluation, we do not take any 
more analysis. The main consideration of 
indistinguishability concentrates on the undetectability 
under the statistical analysis. 
Following the same distribution under existing criteria 
(e.g. KL divergence distance, etc.) is not equivalent to the 
indistinguishability of cover and stego-cover (i.e., Eq. (5)). 
We can analysis that by following three reasons: 1) The 
results of the distribution fitting under the existing criteria 
can be compromised due to the quantity and effectiveness 
of the sampling data; 2) The imperceptibility and 
undetectability cannot always be assured simultaneously in 
state of the art; 3) In view of the large data amount of the 
natural image (even if a single image contains millions of 
pixels), assuming that there is a distribution model of the 
natural image, the model has such a high dimension and an 
extreme difficulty to be understood that it is far from being 
realized by the current computational power and storage 
capacity in reality. However so far, KL distance and its 
variations have been the current best criteria of 
undetectability [3], [5].  
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Eq. (6) indicates that the if there is a deviation between 
cover model and stego-cover model under the existing 
distance criteria, there will be sufficient reasons to 
theoretically prove that the steganographic method cannot 
ensure the indistinguishability.  
In [3], J. Fridrich classified the steganographic methods 
into three main categories: cover-selection, cover-synthesis, 
and cover-modification. The cover-modification based 
steganography is the main body of steganographic 
techniques. The other two categories are concluded as non-
modified steganography in this paper. According to 
information theory, there are artificially irreversible 
changes added into the cover in cover-modification based 
steganography, thus resulting in a distinct deviation when 
fitting the distributions of cover model and stego-cover 
model under KL distance [3]. 
Even so, however, it does not mean that the modified 
cover must be insecure, because in practice, the attacker's 
computational ability is also limited. Moreover, if the 
probability of a successful analysis decreases exponentially 
with the increase of the cover size or the key length in 
steganography, it is possible to construct a data hiding 
method that meets certain complexity requirements and 
security needs in practical applications, namely, the 
calculating complexity of the data hiding method can be 
increased until the attacker cannot finish the analysis within 
the polynomial time [10][11]. On the other hand, since it is 
extremely difficult to ensure the indistinguishability with 
the natural image after modification, a steganographic 
framework, which allows the finite embedding distortion, is 
proposed [12]. Thereafter, it continues to evolve to the 
steganography by minimizing additive distortion using 
Syndrome-Trellis codes (STC) [13], such as HUGO [14], 
WOW [15], MVGG [16], and UED [17].  
However, with deep learning technology introduced into 
steganalysis, its efficient learning ability for high-
dimensional and high-complexity models has continuously 
reduced the availability of the algorithms that are designed 
to meet complexity requirements or finite distortion 
[18][19]. The modification that occurs in the cover without 
mastering the cover model has been becoming a hidden 
threat to stego-security.  
In conclusion, the cover-modification based 
steganographic methods cannot ensure the 
indistinguishability in theory, but can resist certain analysis 
attacks and meet some security requirements in practice. 
However, due to the theoretical natural defects in security, 
with the development of analytical tools, the analysis risk 
of such methods will gradually increase. In view of the 
future development of the secure steganography, this paper 
aims to consider methods that are capable of ensuring the 
indistinguishability of cover and stego-cover theoretically 
and practically. Therefore, besides optimizing the security 
of the cover-modification based methods, we also pay 
attention to the following three data hiding methods:  
1. Steganography based on non-modified steganographic 
methods, whose characteristic is that no modification 
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occurs in the cover after embedding, can effectively 
guarantee the indistinguishability, such as the coverless 
information hiding, and generative steganography based on 
GANs. 
2. Due to the difficulty of building a perfect model of 
natural images, the options of the cover can be further 
broaden, especially the ones with simple unified 
distribution models, such as reversible data hiding in 
encrypted domain (RDH-ED) in the cloud environment. In 
RDH-ED, the cover is the encrypted data that just follows 
the random uniform distribution. The indistinguishability 
essence is to ensure the stego-ciphertext to follow the 
random uniform distribution. 
3. The cover of immeasurable modeling in emerging 
technologies can be selected for steganography, such as 
steganography based on the current quantum technology 
[20]][21] . 
However, considering the current technique conditions, 
steganography based on the above methods 2 and 3 is 
controversial, because their covers have not been 
widespread (The encryption technique in cloud has not 
been standardized, and the quantum technique is still at the 
experimental stage). We enumerate those methods only in 
view of theoretical analysis.  
C.  ALGORITHM-SECRECY OR KEY-SECRECY BASED 
SECURITY 
After ensuring the indistinguishability, the steganographic 
methods need to consider another issue: whether the 
security should be based on the secrecy of algorithms or the 
secrecy of the key with the algorithm open. The basis of 
modern system security usually develops from algorithm 
secrecy to key secrecy with algorithm open, which is 
mainly the choice of the technology development in 
practice. Algorithm-secrecy based security has several 
drawbacks. We can discuss it from the following three 
aspects:  
1. The cost of keeping secrecy. The cost of algorithm-
secrecy based security is relatively high, which includes: 
the algorithms, system software, system hardware, 
operating personnel, and etc.  
2. The cost of updating system. Limited algorithms can be 
supported by one electronic product, so the system needs 
updating frequently. To achieve the same security, 
algorithm- secrecy based security system needs to update 
algorithm, hardware, and personnel operator skills, etc., 
while key-secrecy based security system only needs to 
update another key. 
3. The standardization of security system. Algorithm open 
is the precondition for qualitative analysis on system 
security, as well as the practical popularization. The 
security cannot be proved through open mathematical 
analysis, if the details of an algorithm are kept confidential. 
The method with indeterminate security cannot be applied 
directly to the standardization or industry popularization. 
In conclusion, the practical security system should depend 
on the security under the condition of algorithm open. At 
present, open algorithm is a huge challenge, because it has 
to resist the specific steganalysis. Currently, few methods 
support that. Even STC steganography [13], which is 
generally recognized for its current performance, has a poor 
effect in resisting the specific steganalysis [22].  
Current situations and technical issues in the above two 
aspects seem to predict the "two-step" development of 
steganography security: The first step is to ensure the 
indistinguishability after embedding; second, it should be 
based on key secrecy with algorithm open. Then, the 
steganalysis method would ultimately come down to the 
brute force attack to extract the embedded data directly. At 
this time, stego-security only depends on the size of the key 
space for message extraction. The introduction of the 
concept of key and key space, as well as the 
implementation in steganography can refer to one important 
principle of current cryptosystem, Kerckhoffs’ principle 
[23]. In the next section, we mainly analyze the key in 
steganography. 
III. KEY IN STEGANOGRAPHY 
Key is an important part of secret communication system, 
whose function is not only to extract the message. In 
cryptography, the key determines the visibility of the 
content in secret communication. Likewise, in 
steganography, the key should determine the detectability 
of the existence of the secret communication. The 
significance of this paper emphasizes that the function of 
key should formally embody in stego-security. 
A.  KERCKHOFFS’ PRINCIPLE IN STEGANOGRAPHY 
In stego-security, it is the data hiding method that 
ensures the indistinguishability, while the secrecy of the 
hidden message content with the algorithm open relies on 
the usage principle and the secrecy of the key by 
Kerckhoffs’ Principle. In 2002, Furon, et al., have 
introduced Kerckhoffs’ Principle into the data hiding field 
[24]. In [25], it classified the watermarking attacks 
according to Kerckhoffs’ principle. On the basis of [25], F. 
Cayre defined four levels of watermarking security under 
WOA [6], of which the highest watermarking security was 
denoted as steganography security. But steganography 
security was not discussed any further. In [26], Kerckhoffs’ 
Principle of the steganographic techniques was proposed. 
The framework in [13] also considered that in the case of 
algorithm open. Above all, we emphasized that the usage of 
the key in steganography scheme should be based on 
Kerckhoffs’ Principle, i.e., the key-secrecy based stego-
security only relies on the secrecy of the key, and any 
information except the key about the steganography system 
can be exposed to the attacker.  
B.  KEY IN STEGANOGRAPHY 
In Kerckhoffs based steganography system, the key is not 
the procedural element that reflects the function or purpose 
of the system, but the security element that relates to the 
complexity of the system. It means that certain process 
information of the specific algorithm (such as image block 
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size, LSB or 2LSB as the embedding layer, etc.) should not 
be used as the key, though the secret message would not be 
extracted without such information, which in fact belongs 
to algorithm-secrecy based security. 
Compared with procedural elements of the system, the 
key should have the biggest information entropy, i.e., the 
numerical uncertainty, so as to meet the requirement of a 
large key space. At the same data length, to maximize the 
information entropy, the data should follow the random 
uniform distribution instead of any regular one. Therefore, 
the key is always derived primarily or entirely from the 
random number generator. On the premise of the 
indistinguishability, the key-secrecy based stego-security is 
only determined by the size of the key space provided by 
the steganography algorithm. The key space can be 
quantified by the key length and computational complexity 
theory. The larger key space an algorithm can provide, the 
greater security it can provide (Note that: if the embedded 
data is encrypted with a cipher, the encryption key space (if 
any) provided by the cipher cannot be regarded as the 
steganography key space). We will continue to analyze the 
relationship between the key space and stego-security in 
our future work. 
The necessary conditions of the key-secrecy based stego-
security can be formally obtained:  
Data hiding：  
 ,stegoF 
k
C m C'                                          (7) 
Data extraction:  
     Pr ' 5, , , , 0%extract extractF F   C' k m C' . m'  m m               
(8) 
Security requirements： 
1.  ( ), ( ) 0D P P C C' .  
2. kҠ, Ҡ  R, |Ҡ| meets the certain requirement of 
computational complexity, where k denotes the key, Ҡ 
represents the collection of all possible keys, |Ҡ| is the size 
of the key space, R denotes random number set, and m' 
denotes the message obtained from the stego-cover without 
k. 
The key discussed in this paper is basically in the 
symmetric system. For a public key system, it would 
require an additional condition that the embedding key can 
only be unidirectionally derived from the extraction key. 
The embedding key can be publicly released and the 
extraction key shall be kept secrecy [27].  
IV. CURRENT STEGO-SECURITY MODELS 
Through the above introduction and analysis, we review 
the theoretical models in this part. Since Simmons’ 
prisoners’ problem was proposed in 1984, data hiding 
models have drawn much research attention. Existing data 
hiding theory models are concentrating more on 
watermarking security, in which stego-security just 
represents a securest state that watermark security could 
achieve in theory. Early in 2001, Kalker [2] proposed a 
definition of watermarking security. Then P. Comesana [28] 
in 2005 proposed an information-theoretic framework to 
study watermarking security and robustness, and used it to 
analyze the Spread-Spectrum (SS) data hiding method. In 
[25], the security was classified by introducing four 
attacking modes: known-message attack (KMA), known-
original attack (KOA), watermarking-only attack (WOA), 
and constant-message attack (CMA). F. Cayre further 
defined the four levels of security under WOA [6]. In [29], 
Wang, et al. reviewed watermarking security levels and SS 
embedding methods under WOA. All above models have 
exemplified the security requirements of watermarking 
techniques and the interactions between the data hider 
(Alice, Bob) and the attacker (Eve). However, the behaviors 
and the security target of the interactions under 
watermarking mode are mostly inapplicable under 
steganography mode (as described in Section I). Stego-
security was only considered as the highest security level in 
the watermarking models on extreme hypothesis [6][29]. 
The guiding significance of these models to steganography 
stays at the conceptual level with deficiency of certain 
interactive arguments and practical criterions to 
theoretically demonstrate stego-security.  
On the other hand, there has also been research work 
concentrating on resisting the passive behaviors of Eve and 
evaluating the security using an information-theoretic 
model in [4]. Its security goal was consistent with stego-
security. However, it did not take Eve’s active behaviors 
into consideration and the setup of the attacks might be 
one-sided. Ker in [30] extended the setup by introducing 
the concept of batch steganography and pooled analysis in 
which covers could be accumulation to improve Eve’s 
knowledge. The setup of the attacks in this paper (Section 
V) follows Ker’s line to analysis the different accesses of 
Eve to the stego-system. 
Researches on the indistinguishability of the natural 
cover and stego-cover proposed several theoretical 
criterions, which has been reviewed in Section II. B. In 
Table 1, we enumerate six representative data hiding 
models and the proposed one, and present their modes of 
the prisoners’ problem, the attacking goals, the modes of 
the attacking methods, the theories of their security 
criterions, and whether the algorithms can be open (i.e. key 
secrecy based security). 
In this paper, we attempt to further analysis the stego-
security including the specific principles and the practical 
implementation techniques. As for our attacking setup, Eve 
only needs to complete a passive attacking goal by using 
active or passive attacking methods. If a steganography 
method can simultaneously ensure the indistinguishability 
and provide a large enough key space, the method can be 
considered stego-secure theoretically. But state of the art is 
far from that. From a practical point of view, we impose 
some certain restrictions on the reality conditions, and 
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classify stego-security into different levels in the following sections. 
 
TABLE. 1. DATA HIDING MODELS. 
Literature Mode Attacking goal Attacking mode Security criterions 
Algorithm open 
or not 
[6] watermarking active passive KL divergence distance open 
[4] steganography passive passive Conditional entropy unknown 
[30] steganography passive active 
Hypothesis testing on 
steganalysis probability 
unknown 
[10] steganography passive passive 
complexity on computational 
indistinguishability 
open 
[7] steganography passive unknown steganalysis probability open 
[14] steganography unknown unknown 
Minimized finite embedding 
distortion 
unknown 
The proposed steganography passive active 
Definition 1 in Section I and 
the principles in Section II 
open 
 
V. STEGANALYSIS ATTACKS 
Before introducing the stego-security classification, we 
discuss the different levels of steganalysis attacks. 
According to game theory, there exists the unique 
equilibrium between two rational sides with certain prior 
knowledge and the fixed rules in game. The equilibrium 
state means that both sides have achieved their best rational 
use of prior knowledge and maximized their lowest benefits. 
In the game of steganography and steganalysis, the goal and 
the rules are fixed, so the maximum possible benefit of the 
attack is only associated with the prior knowledge of the 
attacker [31] [32] (related theoretical derivation we will 
discuss in detail in the future work). Therefore, we classify 
the attacks based on the prior knowledge about the 
steganography system that the attacker is assumed to have. 
Intuitively, the more information about the attacking target 
the attacker can obtain, the easier it is to achieve the attack 
goal, and we call it the higher level attack. The higher level 
attack a steganography algorithm can resist, the higher level 
security the algorithm possesses. 
As introduced in Section I, there are two criteria of 
completing the attack goal: one is to detect the stego-cover 
unnatural. The other is to extract messages from the stego-
cover. The first focuses on the cover, and is currently the 
main starting point of steganalysis based on statistical 
modeling and feature analysis. The second focuses on the 
secret message, whose starting point is not to distinguish 
the cover, but to attempt to directly extract meaningful or 
sensitive information from the cover under the conditions 
of the available access and the open knowledge, then it may 
directly determine the presence of steganography.  
This paper draws on the lessons of the implementation of 
cryptanalysis and divides the steganalysis attack into two 
phases: the learning phase and the challenge phase. In the 
learning phase, the attacker learns to analysis the 
steganography method based on current prior knowledge. 
In the challenge phase, the attacker would randomly obtain 
a natural cover or a new stego-cover when the learning 
phase is completed. The challenge would be considered 
successful, if he can distinguish the stego-cover or extract 
the message to determine the presence of steganography 
with a probability bigger than 50%. The challenge would be 
considered failed, if the probability is no bigger than 50%.  
An attack that distinguishes the stego-cover from the 
original ones can be expressed in the following form: 
Based on Definition 2, 
Pr [ D(P(C), P(C')) ≠0] >50%                               (9) 
Based on Definition 3, 
Pr [ D(P(C), P(C')) > ɛ] >50%                            (10) 
An attack that recovers the secret messages from the 
stego-cover can be expressed in the following form: 
 Pr ' 50% m m                                       (11) 
Based on the prior knowledge that the attacker has in the 
learning phase, the following four levels of attacks are 
defined, and the level increases in turn. 
A.  STEGO-COVER ONLY ATTACK (SCOA) 
SCOA is the primary level attack model where the 
steganalysis attacker is assumed to have access only to a set 
of stego-covers. While the attacker has no channel 
providing access to the corresponding original cover prior 
to data hiding, in all practical SCOA, the attacker still has 
some knowledge of the existing natural covers. 
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In the learning phase, the attacker can use the statistical 
analysis method to model the distribution of the natural 
covers. The purpose is to analyze the covers in the open 
channel and then determine the presence of steganography. 
Corresponding to the case in reality, the attacker may 
monitor all public channels. 
After completing the SCOA learning phase, the attacker 
enters the challenge phase.  
B.  KNOWN COVER ATTACK (KCA) 
KCA is an attack model for steganalysis where, in 
addition to the prior knowledge under SCOA, the attacker 
also has several pairs of the original cover and its 
corresponding stego version. The number of pairs is finite 
within the polynomial complexity.  
In the learning phase, the attacker can not only carry out 
the learning in SCOA, but also learn from the pairs of the 
original cover and their stego version. Corresponding to the 
cases in reality, in addition to monitoring all open channels, 
the attacker can also steal original samples by hacking into 
the steganography system, or send spies to steal the original 
samples from the inside. 
After completing the KCA learning phase, the attacker 
enters the challenge phase. 
C.  CHOSEN COVER ATTACK (CCA) 
In addition to the prior knowledge under the KCA, the 
attacker can also invoke several times of embedding or 
extraction process of the current steganography system. The 
number of the invoking operation is finite within the 
polynomial complexity. (It should be noted that the 
embedding and extraction algorithm is already open, and 
the invoking operation is to invoke several times of the key 
used for the present secret communication while the key 
itself remains secret.) 
In the learning phase, in addition to the KCA learning 
phase, the attacker can invoke the embedding or extraction 
process to learn the changes of the cover. The cover used 
for extraction can be a stego-cover or a specific forged 
cover by the attacker. Corresponding to the cases in reality, 
the attacker can remotely control the steganography system 
to implement data embedding or extraction for several 
times, or instigate the user of the system to return several 
operation results. 
After completing the CCA learning phase, the attacker 
enters the challenge phase. 
D.  ADAPTIVE CHOSEN COVER ATTACK (ACCA) 
After the CCA challenge phase, if the attack fails, the 
attacker can continue to restart the CCA learning phase on 
the targeted system, and can repeat the learning and the 
challenge phases several times until the attack succeeds. 
In fact, SCOA can be regarded as the passive attack 
while the other higher level attacks are the active attacks.  
The above classification is mainly based on the attackers’ 
accesses to the cover rather than their different usage rights 
of the secret message, because it is the covers that the 
attacker can directly obtain in the channel, and the 
steganography technology mainly relies on the change of 
the cover to deliver additional information. For the secret 
message, data hider does not care about its content, and the 
content does not provide attackers with much reference for 
future attacks because the message can be encoded or 
encrypted before embedding. If it is random-like, the 
influence on the cover may be indistinguishable.  
VI. STEGO-SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AND 
INSTANCES ANALYSIS 
This section gives instances for explaining the stego-
security classification. An algorithm that can resist a high-
level attack is necessarily resistant to the lower-level 
attacks. 
A.  STEGO-SECURITY AGAINST SCOA 
1) COVERLESS STEGANOGRAPHY 
The main characteristic of coverless steganography is 
that there is no pixel modification on the image exchanged 
in the channel. This section formalizes an abstract coverless 
steganography method based on the method in [33] as an 
instance to analyze its stego-security and practical 
requirements. 
a. Algorithm 
1. Sender and receiver share an image library X 
containing T natural images, X: X={c1, c2, c3,…, cT,}；  
2. Select N (N<T) images randomly from X, and arrange 
them into a permutation, {c1', c2', c3',…, cN',}, there are r 
different permutations, r= ANT =T(T-1)(T-2)…(T-N+1). Each 
permutation corresponds to a sequence si, si{0,1}
l
, l=log2r. 
Therefore, there is a mapping relation: {c1', c2', c3',…, 
cN',} si, si constitutes a set of stego-sequence: S={s1, s2, 
s3,…, sr}. 
3. Secret message collection M: M={m1, m2, m3,…, mr}, 
mi{0,1}
l
. The key kҠ, Ҡ={0,1}l, |Ҡ|=2l； 
Data hiding： 
Fstego(mi, k) 
is equivalent to a map process: M S X, 
1) sj=mi⊕k. 
2) sj
Mapping {c1', c2', c3',…, cN',}. 
Then send the image sequence c'={c1', c2', c3',…, cN',}to 
the receiver.
 
Data extraction: 
Fextract(cj, k) is equivalent to another map process: 
X S M, 
1) {c1', c2', c3',…, cN',} 
Mapping sj. 
2) mi= sj⊕k . 
b. Security 
The original cover in coverless steganography should be 
the library X. Any image from X is natural and will not 
expose the existence of steganography. The message is not 
embedded into an image. Instead, it is represented by the 
changes of the natural image sequence. Namely, the entire 
natural image library X, rather than a certain image, is the 
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original cover. And the sequence of images from X 
corresponding to a particular arrangement is a stego-cover. 
Under SCOA, the attacker can obtain some images from 
{c1', c2', c3',…, cN',}, and the individual image ci' is natural. 
It is impossible to statistically analyze these images to 
distinguish the unnatural cover. Therefore, for the attacker, 
that D(P(c), P(c'))=0 is satisfied. The message was XOR 
encrypted in Step 1 of the data hiding process by using the 
key k. Without k, mi cannot be obtained in Step 2 of the 
extraction process. The key space |Ҡ| is 2l, and |Ҡ| can meet 
certain computational complexity requirement when l is 
large enough. Therefore, coverless steganography is stego-
secure against SCOA. 
Under KCA, the finite images in X are exposed to the 
attacker. In the learning phase, the attacker could find that 
the exchanging image ci' comes from X. In challenge phase, 
the attacker might directly suspect the communication if the 
exchanging images are still from X. Therefore, coverless 
steganography does not resist KCA. 
c. Practical requirements 
According to the security analysis, the security 
requirements of the coverless steganography instance in 
practice are as follows. 
1. The parts to be kept secrecy include: the image library 
X, and the key k. 
2. |Ҡ| meets the certain requirement of computational 
complexity. 
3. The parameters N, T and x which denotes the number 
of times that the algorithm can be securely used or the 
number of the available stego-sequences should satisfy the 
following security requirement: 
Assuming a case that the attacker obtains all the T 
images in X through x stego-sequences randomly, the 
probability of that case is record as PrX(x, N, T), (T< xN). 
To obtain PrX, we first calculate the probability XPr , that 
there are still y images remaining secret to the attacker： 
 
X
Pr , , ,
x
N
T yy
T N
T
C
y x N T C
C

 
  
 
 
                       (12) 
Then PrX can be obtained, 
PrX(x, N, T) = 
 
X
1 1
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y x N T C
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 

 
 
    
 
 
      (13) 
When N T, it is difficult for an attacker to forecast all 
images in X through several stego-sequences. In practice, 
the security requirement on N, T, and x is to ensure PrX (x, 
N, T) small enough, i.e., PrX (x, N, T) < ζ, ζ is an arbitrary 
small value. 
2) GAN BASED GENERATIVE STEGANOGRAPHY 
The main function of generative adversarial networks 
under the semi-supervised state is to generate a controllable 
result that fully follows with the distribution characteristics 
of the training dataset. It has natural advantage to use GAN 
for designing steganographic methods, by which the 
generated stego-cover follows the distribution of the 
training covers. This paper believes that there are two 
constructing frameworks: one is cover first generative 
steganography (CFGS) to generate the secret message 
based on a fixed cover [34], and the other is message first 
generative steganography (MFGS) to generate the stego-
cover based on the fixed desired message. 
a Cover first generative steganography 
In CFGS, a natural image is arbitrarily selected as the 
cover, and the image can be used to generate a secret 
message under the control of the key without any 
modification. The receiver can generate the secret message 
if and only if the cover image and the key are obtained at 
the same time. In [34], two GANs are used to implement 
CFGS: Message-GAN with two networks GM and DM, and 
Cover-GAN with three networks GC, RC and AC.  
GM in Message-GAN is used by the receiver to generate 
message m by inputting the message feature code f. For 
Cover-GAN, the sender uses GC to generate the key k by 
inputting the cover C while the receiver uses RC to obtain f, 
then the message can be obtained through GM. 
(1) Algorithm 
Data hiding: 
1. Randomly select a natural image as the cover, C. 
2. Feature extraction: f =Feature_Extraction(m). 
3. Random 01 sequence is denoted as r with length l, 
l=length(r) = length (f), and then calculate f'= r⊕f. 
4. GC (C, f' )= rc, and the key is obtained: k(r, rc). 
Data extraction: 
1. Obtain the feature code f by using C and k: 
RC (C, rc) = f'                                    (14) 
 f = r⊕f'                                        (15) 
2. Generate the message by using GM : 
m = GM (f )                                         (16) 
(2) Security 
In CFGS, the function of the cover image is to conceal 
the existence of the hidden message and to act as the seed 
for driving the generators. Therefore, it satisfies that 
D(P(C), P(C'))=0 both in SCOA and KCA. Since the 
feature code f is XOR encrypted by k, the message cannot 
be obtained without k due to the Eqs. (14-16). The key 
space |Ҡ|=2l, and |Ҡ| can meet certain computational 
complexity requirement when l is large enough. Therefore, 
coverless steganography is stego-secure against SCOA and 
KCA. 
However, rc of k comes from the data hiding process, 
thus resulting in its limited applications. The 
communication requires the transfer of k. It is somehow 
similar to cryptography, in which it usually introduces 
another data expansion (ciphertext expansion and key 
expansion) to transfer some messages by exchanging the 
two random-like data. Their difference lies in the 
undetectable part (the natural cover) in the CFGS while 
ciphertext or the key in cryptosystem are both in the form 
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of random noise, sensitive for attackers. From this point of 
view, CFGS combines some technical features of 
cryptography and steganography. 
(3) Practical requirements 
The security requirements of CFGS in practice are as 
following: 
1. The part to be kept secrecy is the key k. 
2. |Ҡ| meets the certain requirement of computational 
complexity. 
3. The key k and the cover C cannot be obtained by the 
attacker at the same time. C can be publicly transmitted, 
because it is not modified. Here, k is not required to be 
transmitted through the secret channel, because its content 
is in the random state and does not reveal any information 
about the message content.  
b. Message first generative steganography  
MFGS aims to generate a stego-cover containing the 
message by a generator. This generator can be obtained 
based on GAN. The distribution characteristics of the 
generated cover can be constrained by the GAN to be 
indistinguishable. In this paper, we propose an instance of 
MFGS. 
In the instance, the starting point of constructing the 
cover is the fixed message m. The goal is to generate a 
natural stego-cover C' based on the inpainting GAN in [35], 
in which a corrupted image is inputted for inpainting 
according to the peripheral content of the residual image. 
Several positions from the corrupted part or the residual 
part are fixed in advance for carrying secret messages. In 
the inpainting process, not only the distribution 
characteristics of the natural image need to be guaranteed, 
but also the message at the embedding position cannot be 
destroyed. 
C' = Gen (m)                                     (17) 
where Gen(.) represents an image generation method and C' 
satisfied: 
Requirement 1： m=Fextract(C')                                    (18) 
Requirement 2：D(P(C), P(C'))=0                              (19) 
Requirement 1 guarantees the accuracy of the message 
extraction. Requirement 2 ensures the same distribution that 
the cover and the stego-cover follow. The generated C' is 
not any an existing image from the training set, but it can 
theoretically and practically guarantee its distribution 
follows the distribution of the training images. 
(1) Algorithm 
Data hiding： 
1. Randomly select a natural image I of size h×h and a 
mapping matrix M{0,1}h×h
 
of size h×h. M is used to mark 
the embedded positions. If the value is “0”, it indicates that 
the pixel at the corresponding position of I has no 
information embedded. If the value is “1”, the pixel carries 
additional information. Here, to drive the work of 
complementing GAN, we randomly corrupt the image I, 
and obtain the corrupted image Ic. 
2. The secret message m is XOR-encrypted using a 
random sequence r. The length of m and r is denoted as v:  
s = m⊕r                                         (20)  
3. Replace the LSB (least significant bit) of the pixel at 
embedded position in Ic, and obtain an embedded corrupted 
image Ic'： 
Ic' = Replace ( LSB(Ic'⊙M), s)                        (21) 
Replace (.) represents a bit-wise replacement ； . ⊙ M 
represents to locate the pixels at the embedded positions 
according to the mapping matrix M. 
4. Input Ic' into the inpainting GAN. Finally, the 
complement image C' is obtained. The LSB of the pixel at 
the embedded position in C' is required to be fixed during 
inpainting. C' is the stego-cover and the key k is (r, M). 
Data extraction: 
With C' and k (r, M), the receiver uses the mapping 
matrix M to extract the LSB of the pixel at embedded 
position in C' and finally obtains the message m'. 
s' = LSB(C'⊙M)                            (22) 
m' = s'⊕r                                 (23) 
The working flow of MFGS is shown in Fig. 1. 
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FIGURE. 1. Working flow of MFGS. 
 
(2) Training architecture 
The generator is the crucial piece of MFGS. The training 
goal is to meet the following two conditions in Eqs. 
(19)(24). 
LSB(C'⊙M)= m                                (24) 
GAN generates artificial samples that are indiscernible 
from the real counterparts via the competition between a 
generator (G) and a discriminator (D), i.e., alternating the 
maximization and minimization steps in Eq. (25). 
       
data noise
min max , log log 1C P x P
G D
V D G D D G         
C x    
(25) 
where D(C) is the probability that C is a real image from 
the training dataset rather than synthetic, and G(x) is a 
synthetic image for input x. GAN will finally reach a state 
of Nash equilibrium of G and D. The performances of G 
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and D both get promoted and there is a 50% chance for D to 
distinguish real samples from generated ones by G. Next, 
we analyze how to meet the two conditions.  
Condition 1 (in Eq. (19)), we find the first and second 
derivative of Eq. (25) to obtain the theoretical value of the 
optimal value by the discriminator D [36]: 
 
   
data*
data
G
G
P
D
P P


x
x x
                            (26) 
Eq.(26) is the theoretical best value that the discriminator 
can achieve. For the generator, the best theoretical result is 
Pdata(x)= PG(x), i.e., D(P(C), P(C'))=0, D
*
G =1/2. Then V=-
log4. 
During the training, we use Deep Convolutional GAN 
(DCGAN) [37] for optimization. For G and D, we fix one 
to obtain the best parameter setting of the other 
iteratively： 
 argmax ,G GD V G D                           (27) 
 argmax ,D DG V G D                           (28) 
In practical training, G is based on the back-propagation 
of V to optimize the parameters. When the training 
iterations are enough, the extreme value of G under the 
fixed D can always be obtained. If D
*
G is substituted into 
V(D, G), it is possible to calculate the extreme value of V 
on G, V*( D*G ,G)： 
 * ,GV D G   
 
   
 
   data noise
data data
data data
log log 1C P x P
G G
P P
P P P P
 
    
               
C x
C C x x
 datalog4 2 , log4JSD GD P P                                             (29) 
V*(D*G,G) ≥ -log4. And iff DJSD(Pdata, PG)=0, 
V*(D*G,G)= -log4. In our experiments, DCGAN's final 
training will reach the extreme value of V. At that time, its 
JSD distance is 0. We can believe that the distributions has 
been fitted, because if DJSD(Pdata, PG)=0, and we substitute it 
into Eq.(29), V*(D*G,G)= -log4, which is the same as the 
theoretical value of V when D(P(C), P(C'))=0. 
Condition 2 (in Eq. (24)), the generator parameters 
trained by DCGAN are no longer changed. The noise z is 
inputted into G to generate an image. To satisfy condition 2, 
we introduce the L1 distance to measure the extracted 
message distortion.  
d on the input (X, X') is introduced to show the distortion 
between two sequences X and X' 
 
1
, ' '
N
i i
i
d x x

 X X                               (30) 
This is not to measure the distribution of the two samples, 
but to specifically measure the bit accuracy of the extracted 
messages, so L1 distance is used to establish the message 
distortion, Lmessage： 
Lmessage= d(s, s')                                 (31) 
Then we modify the input z to optimize Lmessage [38], 
when iteratively updating z using back-propagation by  
z
z z messageL z - , 
message
z message
L
L

  
z
                  (32) 
Through enough training, the distortion Lmessage 
theoretically reaches a minimum value of 0. The MFGS 
generator is obtained. 
(3) Experimental Results 
We implement our adversarial training on LFW datasets 
which contains more than 13,000 images of human faces. 
12,000 sample images are used for the training while 
approximately other 1000 sample images are removed from 
the dataset for testing on a NVIDIA Titan XP GPU card. 
The generative network G takes a random 100 dimensional 
vector from uniform distribution among [-1,1] to output a 
64×64×3 image. The discriminator model D is structured 
essentially in reverse order. The input layer is an image 
with 64×64×3 dimensions, and the output layer has a two-
class feedback to minish the loss. As shown in Fig. 2, the 
original images, the corrupted images, stego corrupted 
images, and generated stego images by 500 and 1000 
iterations of updating z are respectively at column 1-5. The 
generated stego images in Fig. 2(a) have a high perceptual 
quality. With the corruption degree on the context growing 
over 50%, the perceptual quality of the generated stego 
images tends to decline. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
FIGURE 2. Instance of MFGS processes: original images, corrupted 
images, stego corrupted images, and generated stego images after 500 
iterations and 1000 iterations. (a) 0.8bpp capacity and 20% missing of 
context; (b) 0.5bpp capacity and 50% missing of context; (a) 0.2bpp 
capacity and 80% missing of context; (a) 0.1bpp capacity and 90% 
missing of context. 
 
We analyze MFGS using the blind steganalyzer in spatial 
domain and the ensemble classifier. 686-dimensional 
SPAM features [39] and 5404-dimensionnal SCRMQ1 
features [40] with ensemble classifiers [41] are 
implemented as random forests in this experiment. As Fig. 
3 shows, the testing errors arise with increasing training 
iterations. All the 1000 stego-covers and 1000 original 
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covers are generated at 1000 iterations from corrupted 
images by the image inpainting. The images are divided 
randomly into two halves, one used for training and the 
other for testing. In Fig. 3, we show the testing errors of the 
payloads from 0.1bpp to 0.5bpp (bits per pixel). The testing 
errors of MFGS are higher than HOGO or HILL when the 
payloads are below 0.2bpp. The errors descend rapidly with 
a high payload due to the hardness of the convergence of 
GAN to eliminate Lmessage. And the message extraction 
accuracy changes with the embedding bit planes, as shown 
in Fig. 4.  
MFGS has the advantage of security guarantee in theory, 
however, the practical performance of MFGS is still 
inferior to state-of-the-art steganographic algorithms, which 
might be improved by introducing high-performance GANs.  
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
FIGURE 3. Error rates for five different payloads (0.1-0.5bpp) with HUGO, 
HILL and our method using (a) SPAM features and (b) SCRMQ1 features. 
 
FIGURE 4. Average extraction error rates for different embedding bit 
planes. 
 
(4) Security 
According to the inpainting principle and experimental 
results of GAN, the generated image C' is not the image I, 
but another new image that fits the distribution 
characteristics of the training image dataset. The role of I is 
to drive the natural completion. The distribution 
characteristics of the generated images come from the 
training dataset, and rely on GAN's powerful learning 
ability. Therefore, the original cover in MFGS is not a 
single image, but a type of image group with certain 
distribution characteristics. Such characteristics might be 
quite complex and difficult to describe by establishing a 
model. There should be an infinite number of theoretical 
images belonging to the group, but they cannot represent all 
natural images.  
Without knowing training dataset, it is difficult to 
describe the characteristics or infer the training dataset 
backwards through a number of generated images or a 
trained GAN. In the absence of the key, the message cannot 
be extracted due to Eqs. (17-18). Key space 
|Ҡ|=2h·h×2v=2h·h·v, and |Ҡ| meets the certain computational 
complexity when v and h are large enough. Therefore, 
MFGS is stego-secure against SCOA. 
However, the number of the training images and the 
training iterations is limited. Therefore, the characteristics 
that can be reflected are also limited. In KCA, the training 
set should be exposed to the attacker. In the learning phase, 
the attacker can use the GAN tool to train a discriminator 
capable of distinguishing the image characteristics through 
a purposefully expanded training set. In challenge phase, if 
the images exchanged in the channel always conform to the 
characteristics of the known dataset, it can be considered 
suspectable. Therefore, MFGS is not stego-secure against 
KCA. 
(5) Practical requirements 
The security requirements of MFGS in practice are as 
follows. 
1. The parts to be kept secrecy include: the training 
dataset, and the key k. 
2. |Ҡ| meets the certain requirement of computational 
complexity. 
B.  Stego-Security against KCA 
1) ALGORITHM 
The instance of the stego-secure algorithm against KCA 
is the LWE-based RDH-ED [42]. Ciphertext has the 
advantage to act as the cover because of its simple model, 
the randomly uniform distribution. The security focus 
would be to ensure the stego-ciphertext evenly distributed. 
Of course, the practical significance of utilizing methods of 
RDH-ED for steganography remains controversial currently. 
Here, we assume that ciphertext can act as a steganographic 
cover, mainly from the theoretical perspective to analyze 
the security. 
In [42], controllable redundancy of LWE cryptosystem is 
analyzed and utilized for data hiding. The encryption 
blowup of LWE comes from the quantization vector in 
decryption, which is not controllable for attackers while the 
LWE encryption key keeper can control it. The range of a 
quantization element in the quantization vector takes up 
half of the integer domain q (q is a big Integer) to recover 
1 bit plaintext, i.e., a quantization element with q/2 possible 
values only corresponds to 1 bit of plaintext. Scheme [42] 
takes advantage of the redundancy of quantization element 
to embed data. There are more detail descriptions in [42] 
about the methodology and theoretical analysis. In this 
section, we concentrate on its security in KCA. 
2) SECURITY 
In KCA, the attacker has access to severer pairs of the 
original cover C and its corresponding stego-cover C'. As 
for the LWE based RDH-ED, the original cover is LWE 
encrypted data which follows a random uniform 
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distribution, a straightforward and unified distribution. A 
crucial criterion of the security in [42] is to ensure that the 
marked ciphertext (stego-cover) should follow the same 
distribution to maintain the hardness of LWE encryption 
and the undetectability. The probability distribution 
function (PDF) and statistical features after embedding, 
including histogram, mean, and the average information 
entropy, have been analyzed to prove that. Therefore, in 
KCA, LWE based RDH-ED meets D(P(C), P(C'))=0. 
According to [42], key space |Ҡ| could meet the security 
with resistance to quantum computing analysis. Therefore, 
the example in [42] has reached the stego-security against 
KCA. 
In CCA, an attacker can invoke the current key several 
times to perform an embedding or extraction operation. 
Therefore, all the possible open parameters at each step of 
these operations should not reveal any clues to the existence 
of steganography. However, the example in [42] cannot 
ensure that, because the quantization vectors from original 
ciphertext and stego-ciphertext would follow different 
distributions (shown in Fig. 5, there are more peaks in Fig. 
5c-5d than in Fig. 5a-5b), which is decided by the data 
hiding levels and the sampling of keys. In RDH-ED, there 
are two types of keys: encryption/ decryption key and data-
hiding key. The decryption key should be secrecy in the 
cryptosystem, but when analyzing the stego-security from 
the perspective of the steganography system, we can 
assume that the encryption key can be assumed to be 
compromised by the steganalysis attacker, and only the 
data- hiding key is secret. In conclusion, the threat in CCA 
lies in that the decryption process could expose the 
presence of data hiding. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
(c) 
 
(d) 
FIGURE 5.Distributions of quantization vectors from original ciphertext 
and stego-ciphertext with q=56701: (a)-(b) Original ciphertext; (c) Stego-
ciphertext after once data hiding; (d) Stego-ciphertext after multilevel 
data hiding. 
In the CCA learning phase, the attacker can learn the 
differences of distribution characteristics of the quantized 
vectors in the decryption or message extraction stage. In the 
challenge phase, it obtains the quantization vectors by using 
only part of the decryption key, and then it could confirm 
the presence of the steganography with a large correct rate. 
Therefore, the example in [42] cannot reach the stego-
security against CCA. 
3) PRACTICAL REQUIREMENTS 
1. The parts to be kept secrecy include: the decryption 
key and the data-hiding key. Specifically speaking, only the 
secret key of LWE owner should operate data hiding 
because of his access to the controllable redundancy. To 
improve the security, the decryption key could be 
transmitted to others by using some key distribution 
strategy or introducing LWE based proxy re-encryption 
technology [42]； 
2. |Ҡ| meets the certain requirement of computational 
complexity. 
C.  Stego-Security against CCA 
The stego-security against CCA requires that the 
steganography system has no possibility of expose the 
presence of steganography in the various operations. That is, 
the process parameters that may be disclosed to the attacker 
do not provide any content that can be differentiated or 
directly related to the hidden data itself. With regard to the 
instance against CCA, it can be a RDH-ED based 
steganography that supports third-party embedding. The 
original ciphertext and the stego-ciphertext are both 
random-evenly distributed. The data hider and the plaintext 
content holder can be different persons. Each of them is 
assigned a key independently. The processes of message 
extraction and the plaintext decryption are completely 
separable.  
The RDH-ED based on the self-blinding Paillieris 
algorithm in [43] can be an instance here if it is used to 
implement steganography. It needs to calculate a self-
blinding parameter first, and then use different keys and 
quantization methods to perform the decryption or the 
extraction operation. Paillier algorithm is used for 
encrypting. After embedding, the ciphertext maintains a 
good random distribution in the absence of the data-hiding 
key, even if the decryption key is available. In CCA, the 
self-blinding parameters are consistent with random and 
will not expose the presence of steganography. Only when 
the data-hiding keys are mastered, can the parameters 
indicate the secret messages. Therefore, this method can 
achieve the stego-security against CCA. 
However, the Paillier encryption algorithm itself cannot 
resist the adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (ACCA, or 
CCA2) [44], and the ciphertext is the cover in the stego-
system. Therefore, in ACCA of steganalysis, the Paillier 
encryption based algorithm cannot guarantee plaintext 
security, and will expose the existence of the hidden data in 
the plaintext with a large possibility. 
D.  Stego-Security against ACCA 
Currently, the instance against ACCA has not yet an 
available method. It needs the data hiding method to resist 
the attacker's arbitrary invoking of the system. Namely, 
during the repeated attack attempts, no attack experience 
will be accumulated. To achieve this kind of security, this 
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paper believes that there might be (not limited to) several 
possible methods: 
1. To introduce RDH-ED based on cryptography against 
CCA2 to implement steganography. 
2. Steganography based on quantum information hiding; 
3. To set the number and type of training images, and the 
training iterations big enough in MFGS to meet certain 
security requirements. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This paper discusses several theoretical issues and 
principles in steganography security. We complement the 
setup of the attacker, Eve, in the steganography model that 
Eve could be given more active privileges only to complete 
a passive attacking goal. Therefore, stego-security requires 
the system should ensure (passive or active) Eve cannot 
complete the two attack goals in Definition 1. The 
indistinguishability of cover and stego-cover is the first 
guarantee of stego-security. In practice then, stego-security 
should be key-secrecy based. We formalize the necessary 
conditions of stego-security according to Kerckhoffs’ 
principle in steganography. Finally, algorithm instances of 
the four security levels are presented and analyzed. This 
paper focuses on theoretical analysis of security, aims to 
provide theoretical reference for the future developments or 
improvements of the steganography technology.  
Furthermore, there are another two views of the future 
research on stego-security: 
1. To improve keys’ distributing by further introducing 
the mechanism of public key system into steganography. 
2. To achieve the check of the integrity of the secret 
message, as well as the authentication of the source of the 
hidden message. 
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